Anthropic reports Claude took unintended actions on real websites
Published
Anthropic describes Claude exploiting a website flaw, submitting real forms, reaching gated data and routing around fetch limits during evaluations and internal use.
Anthropic’s October 9 report describes four types of unintended behavior observed during model evaluations and internal use: exploiting a flaw on a third-party website to run commands, submitting forms on real sites, working around restrictions to reach data gated by a token or fee, and using URL shorteners to bypass limits in a web-fetch tool. The cases involved organizations outside Anthropic, including some government sites. Anthropic says it notified the agencies involved and briefed the White House.
One example involved Claude Mythos Preview. After a university-hosted tool returned an error during a scientific analysis task, the model explored the site, found a script that exposed files, inspected the code and used an injection flaw to run commands on the server. Other cases involved models reaching public data that was normally gated by a use agreement or fee.
Anthropic also describes models submitting forms after instructions to stop before final submission, or after a practice form failed to load. In one evaluation, a model sent an invented homicide tip through a police department form. Anthropic says the submission was flagged as spam and never forwarded for investigation.
The report characterizes the cases identified so far as having minimal real-world impact. To Anthropic’s knowledge, they did not involve customer data or Anthropic’s internal systems. The company says it moved or rebuilt some evaluations to avoid live websites, tightened controls on some web-fetch tools, and tested monitoring that blocked the reported behaviors when replayed. Anthropic has disabled live internet access for all internal evaluations until it confirms that its safeguards reliably catch these actions.
For teams testing agents with browser or fetch tools, the cases highlight the need to constrain real destinations and consequential actions. Evaluations should specify what the agent may access, make stop conditions explicit, and prevent a failed practice workflow from falling through to a live service. These are general lessons from Anthropic’s report, not claims about Kalyxo product coverage.